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In this paper, we describe a user-centric access control 
process for devices and services in smart space 
environments. The M-Zones Access Control (MAC) 
Process is driven by context information relating to the 
activities of the users present in a smart space, and by 
user-defined policies reflecting these users’ preferences. 
As well as dynamically assigning access rights in 
response to context changes, the process provides for 
automatic reconfiguration of resources in order to 
protect a user’s privacy as other users enter/leave his/her 
vicinity. To illustrate the implementation of the process 
we discuss its realisation in a test bed emulating an 






Ubiquitous computing environments are characterised 
by the use of a wide range of user interfaces, for 
example, communal displays, voice-based command 
interfaces, and gesture recognition systems. The 
presence of such interfaces heightens users’ awareness 
of, and requirements for, privacy protection measures. 
When using such interfaces, users may desire that the 
system automatically reacts to the environment in which 
they are present, in particular so that their privacy 
concerns are addressed. The presence of individual or 
groups of users in an environment constitutes a key 
element of the environment context. In many cases the 
process of defining what actions need to be taken will 
depend on the relationships between a user and these 
other individuals. Furthermore, a user’s access rights 
should be determined based on ongoing analysis of the 
environment in which they are present, including 
analysis of the access rights and activities of other 
individuals present in his/her vicinity. 
In this paper we investigate how a management system 
for a ubiquitous computing environment can control 
access rights in a manner that adapts to the preferences 
of the user set present, or active, within a physical 
space, but within the constraints imposed by system-
wide management policies. In particular, we focus on 
the use of context information as a key trigger for the 
reconfiguration of services and resources in order to 
adapt user access rights and protect user privacy. Users 
are themselves afforded the opportunity to define 
policies embodying their preferences for actions to take 
place based on changes in the environment they are 
present in. A user policy could specify a preference for 
particular actions to take place if certain events occur in 
the presence of specific individuals, individuals with 
specified roles, or individuals possessing specified 
access rights. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly 
review previous work on access control approaches in 
ubiquitous computing environments, focussing in 
particular on utilisation of context information as a 
means of defining this behaviour. We then describe the 
operation of a Ubiquitous Management Architecture 
(UMA) with particular emphasis on the use of a Context 
Information Manager (CIM) as a provider of context 
information. The M-Zones Access Control (MAC) 
process is then presented, and its integration with a 
policy-based management system to allow for the 
reconfiguration of services and resources to protect user 
privacy is described. We outline the implementation of 
the CIM and MAC process in a test bed emulating an 
office-based environment, and describe its operation in 
the context of a specific use case scenario. Finally, we 
summarise the benefits of the proposed approach and 
outline future work. 
 
 





Many systems employ role-based access control, in 
which users are assigned one or more roles, typically 
mapping to functions in an organisational hierarchy, 
with each role being associated with a defined profile of 
access permissions. Whilst offering flexibility and 
relatively low management overhead, it can be argued 
that this approach does not provide the fine-grained 
control required in many ubiquitous computing 
applications. The ability to assign access rights based 
solely on a user’s organisational role is insufficient in 
many ubiquitous computing environments where other 
attributes are likely to be more relevant when assigning 
access rights. Typical attributes that might be desirable 
as conditions in defining access rights include a user’s 
current activity (for example, meeting chairperson), the 
resources he/she is currently accessing, and other 
contextual information, such as his/her project 
affiliation, or the presence of unauthorised users in the 
environment. To overcome these drawbacks, access 
control decisions can instead be based on specific 
attributes associated with a user, rather than on the 
user’s identity or assigned organisational role(s). These 
attributes can relate to user profile values, the current 
activity of the user or outline information about the 
environment specifically. This attribute based approach 
is at the core of the eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) (1), which has been used to 
provide access control in systems such as PRIMA (2) 
and Cardea (3).  
Ideally, access control solutions would automatically 
adjust access rights based on the changing context in 
which users are requesting access to resources; this is 
known as context-based access control. From an access 
control perspective, user location, presence of a group 
of users in a location, the relationship between the users 
within such groups, set of services currently available 
and the particular activities users are engaged in, are 
likely to be of most relevance. Basing access control 
decisions on this kind of information is an important 
research topic presently; for example, Corradi at al. (4) 
have developed UbiCOSM, a context-centric access 
control middleware that assigns access rights taking into 
account context, user profiles and system/user-level 
authorisation policies. Also, Sampemane at al. (5) 
address aspects of context-based access control for 
ubiquitous computing environments, describing a 
system that changes access rights depending on the set 
of users and the activity being undertaken in a physical 
space. 
Based on the above observations we conclude that 
access control systems for ubiquitous computing  
environments should be: 
• user-centric: allow users the freedom to adjust 
access rights as their needs evolve; 
• attribute-based: access control decisions should be 
based on evaluation of appropriate user attributes, 
not rigidly on their identity or pre-assigned role(s); 
• context-driven: access rights should be dynamically 
assigned based on analysis of context information 
provided by the environment. 
To realise these properties we employ a policy-based 
management approach in which access rights 
assignment, as well as resource configuration based on 
access rights, is achieved through context-driven 
analysis of system and user-specific policies.  
 
 




The access control solution we propose has been 
realised in the context of a “Ubiquitous Management 
Architecture” (UMA) (6), developed as part of the 
M-Zones research programme (7). The UMA 
approaches management of ubiquitous computing 
environments, specifically smart spaces, by introducing 
the concept of “Managed Zones” (M-Zones) 
corresponding to administrative domains encompassing 
one or more distinct smart spaces. The UMA adopts a 
policy-based management (PBM) approach to facilitate 
intra- and inter- smart space management. The concept 
of PBM is being widely adopted in the 
Telecommunications and Internet Management area, for 
example the IETF have developed a PBM standard for 
access control (8). In the UMA Policy Decision Points 
(PDPs) (where policy rules are triggered in response to 
events and appropriate re-configuration operations 
generated) are organised in two levels, following the 
hierarchical approach described by Ghamri-Doudane et 
al. (9). The PDP at the upper (M-Zone) level is 
responsible for all high level policies relating to the 
administration of the smart spaces. When a policy 
decision is required at the upper (M-Zone) level the 
PDP interprets the relevant policies and sends the 
decision in the form of modified low-level policies to 
the smart space(s) in question. The PDP at the smart 
space level is then responsible for enforcing the low 
level policies, generating policy decisions in the form of 
configuration operations that are expedited by Policy 
Enforcement Points (PEPs). The smart space PDPs and 
PEPs also control the discovery and execution of 
services. Applying this approach to access control we 
have ongoing decision making relating to access rights 
occurring at the M-Zone level (via the MAC Process), 
with access rights being communicated to individual 
smart spaces in the form of access control lists (in effect 
low-level policies), which are enforced by the local PDP 
and PEPs. 
The MAC Process forms part of the M-Zones PDP and 
is responsible for reaching access control policy 
decisions and for collating relevant information from 
other UMA components needed to inform these 
decisions. There are two other UMA components 
involved in access control at the M-Zone level: the CIM 
and Personal Information Managers (PIMs) associated 
with users. The CIM is an integral part of the 
architecture and is further explained in §3.1; it is 
responsible for gathering, aggregating and semantically 
enhancing context information subscribed to by the 
MAC Process and for notifying the MAC Process when 
context changes pertaining to the environment and users 
occur. Each user has associated with him/her a PIM, 
which stores their user profiles, preferences and 
policies, and also acts as their interface to the system. 
The MAC Process interacts with the CIM and PIM in 
order to assign access rights based on policies relating 
to the smart spaces themselves – “system” policies, and 
“user” policies (retrieved from the PIMs of users 
currently present in the smart space), in response to 
context change events notified by the CIM and/or events 
outlining changes in a users profile including changes to 
a users personal preference policies notified by the PIM. 
 
 
3.1 Context Information Manager Operation 
 
 
The CIM is responsible for collecting context 
information provided by diverse sources, then 
aggregating and processing this information, so that is 
structured in a manner amenable for use by context-
aware entities. The operation of the CIM is illustrated in 
Figure 1 below. It makes use of the smart space 
repository, which contains a listing of all available 
services and their associated context information, so that 
it gets a consistent view of the environmental context, 
maintaining and updating this view whenever a change 
is detected. The CIM responds to two types of requests 
for context information: ad-hoc and subscription-based. 
Ad-hoc requests are simpler in nature and result in a 
single piece of context information being delivered to 
the requesting entity. In certain cases CIM may need to 
perform the conversion of the data into the format 
appropriate for use by the requesting entity (for example 
converting spatial coordinates into physical locations). 
Subscription-based requests are more complicated, since 
context-aware applications specify a set of conditions 
that are monitored actively by the CIM, so the response 
is sent only when the specified conditions hold true. The 
MAC process makes use of the subscription based 
requests. 
The CIM provides context information that can be 
sensed directly from the environment (for example, 
temperature or user location). However, a more 
challenging task is to provide context information that 
cannot be sensed directly, for example, a meeting taking 
place between a group of users. Since such events 
cannot be observed directly, the CIM uses a set of rules 
that govern the outcome of an inference process, which, 
in conjunction with information retrieved from the 
environment, can be applied to deduce useful results for 
exploitation by context-aware applications. In the 
existing implementation the only entity requesting 
context information from the CIM is the M-Zone PDP’s 
MAC process, which configures CIM to pass on context 
notifications expressing them using a set of ontological 
terms pre-agreed between the CIM and the MAC 
process. 
In terms of communications, the CIM employs a 
publish/subscribe mechanism. The MAC process 
initially sends a request to the CIM with the context 
information it is interested in. This request specifies a 
set of rules that are of relevance, so that notifications 
will be sent when those rules are assessed to be true. 
The main interface to the CIM is the component that 
listens for context requests from other entities. As soon 
as the request is made, the process of negotiating a 
common ontology begins. Once the CIM and the 
requesting entity have agreed on the ontology to use, the 
request can be parsed. Since the CIM responds to two 
types of requests, ad-hoc and subscription-based, the 
parsing process determines the type of request. Ad-hoc 
requests will typically involve retrieving data from one 
context source, in contrast with the more complex 
subscription-based requests that requires the 
aggregation of data from multiple context sources. As 
the CIM collects, processes and monitors context 
information from the environment it analyses whether it 
matches with any of the rules specified by its 
subscribers. When a match occurs, the CIM notifies the 
subscribing component, in this case the MAC process, 
the event description and additional information deemed 
relevant to the subscriber with regards to that particular 
event. 
 
Figure 1: CIM process flowchart 
 
 
3.2 MAC Process Operation 
 
 
The MAC process is realised via a XACML policy 
engine (10), which allows for reaching policy decisions 
on the basis of the value of arbitrary user attributes. In 
our case these attribute values are stored in user PIMs, 
or are values of attributes of the environment itself (the 
latter being notified by CIM context events). As well as 
re-configuring access rights, the MAC process analyses 
whether user policies indicate that specified actions be 
requested as a result of the notified event. For example, 
users may desire that configuration actions be taken to 
protect their privacy in the presence of users unknown 
to them. Once the process has been completed PDPs at 
the smart space level are forwarded new access control 
lists to be enforced for users currently in the space, and 
configuration actions generated from policy analysis. 
 
Figure 2: MAC process flow chart. 
Figure 2 above outlines the flow concerning the access 
control decision mechanism implemented by the MAC 
process. The MAC process subscribes to the relevant 
components (PIM/CIM) in order to be notified should 
an event occur that requires access control decisions. 
Events that would typically be monitored include the 
entry/exit of users, or the changing of an attribute value 
that was considered as a condition of an active policy. 
When a user enters the smart space in question the 
MAC process retrieves the relevant user policies from 
the respective PIM. Static policy conflict detection is 
then carried out with respect to system and user policies 
in order to enforce the appropriate set of policies (see 
below for a description of this part of the process). The 
MAC process then evaluates the respective access rights 
for the Smart Space resources. This is achieved by 
iterating through the applicable policies governing 
access to each Smart Space resource. Should the event 
the MAC Process be notified of a change in an attribute 
value that forms the condition of an active policy, this 
again necessitates the identification of the resources 
affected and the re-evaluation of the various resource 
polices in order to reconfigure the relevant access rights. 
Central to the success of the MAC process in providing 
an adaptive access control is its ability to detect and 
resolve conflicts between various user and system 
policies that may occur in certain operational contexts. 
Conflict detection involves the identification of actual 
or potential policy conflicts. In general two approaches 
to conflict resolution are possible: revoke, re-specify 
and re-deploy offending policies, or let the system 
assign precedence levels that dictate which of the 
conflicting policies are actually invoked, with the latter 
approach being more practical. Precedence can be 
assigned based on, for example, specific policies 
overriding general policies; newer policies override 
older policies; or policies specified by a higher authority 
overriding those specified by lower authorities. As 
described in (11), we have enhanced the XACML 
policy engine’s policy conflict/detection resolution 
facilities to realise configurable policy precedence 
schemes, by allowing specification of sets of attributes 
based on which precedence can be evaluated. Thus, how 
a scheme is implemented will be environment-specific, 
but will be based on appropriate attributes, for example 
security levels, or date/time. Our implementation targets 
an office environment (see §4.1), and ranks policies 
based on the resource in question, the policy author’s 
organisational role, the policy author’s project 
affiliation, the policy author’s current activity, and the 
project context in which resource is being accessed. 
 
 




Figure 3 below illustrates the test bed in which the 
MAC process has been realised. For the test bed, the 
Ubiquitous Management Architecture has been partially 
deployed onto the TSSG/O2 Home of the Future 
ubiquitous computing environment (12). Access to 
resources and services is managed through the policy-
based management system described in (9), which is 
based on the COPS-SD protocol. 
The test bed consists of a number of PEPs controlling 
household/office devices/services by means of UPnP, 
Jini and proprietary approaches to service discovery and 
resource access. PEPs have COPS-SD wrappers to 
allow them communicate with their smart space PDP. 
Access to devices in the test-bed is ultimately controlled 
by the M-Zone PDP’s MAC process, which uses 
COPS-SD to inform the smart space PDP of access 
rights to enforce. To test the operation of the MAC 
process a COPS-SD wrapped PEP was developed; this 
PEP controls a HP projector – the device used to realise 
the office-based use case scenario as described in §4.1. 
The PIM has been implemented as a web service to host 
the user profiles. When a user initially enters an M-Zone 
they provide a link to their PIM, which will then be 
queried for the credentials required for authentication. 
The PIM also acts as a repository for user policies, 
including those dictating desired actions in the presence 
of other users. The PIM provides notifications to the 
M-Zone PDP if user attributes or policies are modified 
by a PIM, as, in many cases, these modifications will 
necessitate reconfiguration of access policies, or 
generation of new configuration action requests. 
 
Figure 3: Test bed Architecture. 
Context notifications, specifically user location and 
presence information are generated using the Ubisense 
simulator software (13), which has been used to model 
the movement of individuals along predefined paths 
through an office environment equipped with ultra-
wideband (UWB) location detection. The current CIM 
implementation passes on context notifications as 
requested by the M-Zone PDP and in this instance the 
MAC Process in particular, expressing them in 
ontological terms understood by the MAC process. 
However MAC process and CIM may not necessarily 
utilise a shared ontology. Therefore prior to any 
communication taking place, the process of ontology 
negotiation has to be completed. The ontology 
negotiation is critical since it allows the different 
entities to understand mutual concepts, provided the 
negotiation is successful. Ontology negotiation is 
realised through an ontology server. In cases when 
concepts between two entities do not match, the 
ontology server is used to resolve the ambiguity. 
Essentially the ontology server includes the mappings 
between similar concepts. Once the concepts have been 
resolved and the entities have agreed on the common 
notation, further communication can take place. 
 
 
4.1 Office-based Access Control Case Study 
 
 
We now discuss a use case scenario in order to illustrate 
the MAC process functionality, in particular, how 
access rights adapt to the changing user set present and 
how policy conflicts are handled. The scenario concerns 
a meeting room owned by Company X, in which a 
projector service is used by meeting participants. This 
scenario highlights the role of context information as a 
means of defining expressive policies embodying the 
adaptive behaviour of the solution proposed while also 
highlighting how context information can be harnessed 
as a means of assigning policy precedence as a means of 
policy conflict resolution. In particular, it explores how 
policy conflicts between individuals at similar levels in 
an organisational role hierarchy (for example Alice and 
Bill in Figure 4) are resolved by harnessing context 
information such as smart space roles and the “project 
context” in which the meeting is taken place. 
 
Figure 4: Company X's Organisational Chart 
In the scenario Bill is a project manager and Alice is an 
accountant. Both are assigned to the Product Y project, 
and are conducting a meeting together, in which Alice is 
presenting the project financial accounts using the 
projector service. Both have been previously 
authenticated and authorised regarding the various 
services, including the projector service, available in the 
meeting room smart space. Bill as project manager is 
responsible for assigning access rights in the meeting 
room routinely used by the project, and as such has 
defined a policy which permits all project members to 
use all resources at all times. On the other hand, Alice 
has specified a policy that denies all users, herself 
included, access to the projector service should a non 
project member enter the room (a fragment of this 
policy is shown in Figure 5). This is to prevent 
unauthorised users seeing sensitive financial 
information relating to the project, so, if a guest enters 
the meeting room her access to the projector is revoked, 
and her presentation will be immediately removed from 
the projector.  
 
Figure 5: Fragment of Alice’s Projector Policy 
Clearly, Alice and Bill’s policies conflict with each 
other, but only should an unauthorised user be present in 
the room. Both policies will be deployed as they won’t 
always conflict with each other. This conflict 
necessitates dynamic policy conflict detection and 
resolution. Typical “Higher Authority Overrides Lower 
Authority” based approaches assign precedence to those 
users higher in the company hierarchy over those 
specified by users lower in the hierarchy (which would 
favour Bill in this scenario). However the precedence 
scheme for the meeting room smart space is configured 
such that policies specified by a user currently 
presenting and thus a presenter smart space role and 
accountant organisational role always have precedence 
over policies specified by a user that has a manager 
organisational role and an audience smart space role, 
thus, in this case, Alice’s policy is enforced.  
Bob, a guest, now enters the meeting room. The MAC 
Process receives notification via the subscription/ 
notification agreement it has with the CIM. The 
notification triggers the assignment of access rights to 
the new entrant based on system policies and any 
relevant policies of other users in the space. In this case 
the MAC Process examines the relevant policies 
governing access to the projector service. This leads to a 
conflict between Bill and Alice’s policies. The 
precedence scheme employed favours Alice’s policy as 
outlined above; thus her own access to the projector 
service is revoked, and the projector is blanked before 
Bill has a chance to see the sensitive information 
contained in Alice’s presentation. 
 
 
5 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
This paper has outlined an approach to access control in 
ubiquitous computing environments that realises user-
centric, attribute based access control, based on analysis 
of both system and user-defined policies. It harnesses 
context information relating to the user set present in a 
physical space and the context in which resources are 
accessed, as inputs into the access right configuration 
process. Furthermore, based on preferences specified in 
user policies, it supports automatic configuration of 
resources in response to changes in the profile of this 
user set. The approach allows the organisation 
administering the ubiquitous computing infrastructure to 
set policies governing default access rights associated 
with users, but also gives users themselves scope to 
dynamically affect, within the constraints imposed by 
system policies, the access rights of others and to ensure 
that resources are automatically configured to ensure 
their privacy is protected. Management functionality is 
therefore partially the responsibility of the user, 
resulting in a more user-centric system that adapts to 
changing user needs, but not in a manner that violates 
system-wide policies. 
The MAC process currently provides for allocation of 
access rights to devices and services that are managed 
by the organisation controlling the ubiquitous 
computing infrastructure. It does not address the 
scenario in which users themselves make devices or 
services available to other users in their vicinity. In such 
a scenario policies defined by the user would be 
expected to take precedence over policies defined by 
other users, or organisations controlling the 
infrastructure. Future work will focus on how the MAC 
process can be generalised to address the complexities 
of access rights assignment where services and devices 
are controlled by multiple parties. 
The CIM implementation at present is heavily focused 
on location and presence information with further 
context sources to be integrated as soon as they become 
available. The knowledge engineering process presently 
is rule based and we are currently investigating 
techniques to allow dynamic evolution of these rules 
based on the observations from the environment that 
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